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Continuous-variable quantum digital signatures over insecure channels
Matthew Thornton,∗ Hamish Scott, Callum Croal, and Natalia Korolkova
University of St Andrews
Digital signatures ensure the integrity of a classical message and the authenticity of its sender.
Despite their far-reaching use in modern communication, currently used signature schemes rely on
computational assumptions and will be rendered insecure by a quantum computer. We present
a quantum digital signatures (QDS) scheme whose security is instead based on the impossibility
of perfectly and deterministically distinguishing between quantum states. Our continuous-variable
(CV) scheme relies on phase measurement of a distributed alphabet of coherent states, and allows for
secure message authentication against a quantum adversary performing collective beamsplitter and
entangling-cloner attacks. Crucially, for the first time in the CV setting we allow for an eavesdropper
on the quantum channels and yet retain shorter signature lengths than previous protocols with no
eavesdropper. This opens up the possibility to implement CV QDS alongside existing CV quantum
key distribution (QKD) platforms with minimal modification.
I. INTRODUCTION
Digital signatures are among the most commonly used
primitives in modern cryptography [1, 2]. Like a hand-
written signature, a digital signature ensures the authen-
ticity of both a classical message and its sender. Inher-
ently involving multiple parties, the signature prevents a
malevolent party from creating a false message and at-
tributing it to an honest party; and if the signature con-
vinces one party that a message is genuine then it should
convince the other parties. Despite their far-reaching
use in our modern technological infrastructure–e.g. in
e-commerce, online banking and checking the integrity
of downloads–currently used signature schemes such as
RSA, DSA and ECDSA will be rendered insecure by a
future quantum computer [2–5].
Quantum digital signatures (QDS) rectify this by bas-
ing their security not on computational assumptions
about difficult to invert “one-way functions”, but on
physical properties, namely, the impossibility to per-
fectly and deterministically distinguish between non-
orthogonal quantum states [4–16]. Quantum states are
used to distribute a classical signature which is later used
to sign a classical message. While modern QDS shares
some similarities in implementation with quantum key
distribution (QKD), their aims differ significantly. The
most notable difference is that that–unlike QKD–in QDS
any subset of the participants may be dishonest, and each
dishonest player may have different goals and strategies
which must be considered in a full proof.
Although the first QDS schemes [6] relied on infeasi-
ble requirements like the production and storage of large
entangled states, there has since been a push towards
practical and implementable QDS. The past decade has
done away with the need for an optical multiport [7, 8],
quantum memory [9, 10], and recent progress has even
removed the need for single photon sources [11–14] for se-
cure QDS. More recently the assumption of secure quan-
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tum channels for distribution of quantum states has been
discarded, and modern QDS protocols take into account
both the ability for a player inside the scheme to be
dishonest, and the presence of an external eavesdropper
[13, 15, 16].
As with QKD, there are two approaches to QDS, the
discrete-variable (DV) and continuous-variable (CV) pro-
tocols. DV QDS relies on photon-number detection of
either weak coherent pulses [13, 14, 17–19] or single pho-
tons [16, 20]. The relatively low dimensional Hilbert
space required for these schemes allows for an advanced
level of security analysis, and their high resilience to
loss allows for long distances to be bridged securely,
with O
(
10−1
)
seconds required to sign a 1-bit message
[17, 21, 22]. The first QDS scheme over insecure channels
required a signature length of 7.7 × 105 to sign a 1 bit
message, in a scheme similar to decoy-state QKD [13].
In contrast, CV QDS encodes information into contin-
uous degrees of freedom, usually the phase of the elec-
tromagnetic field, and homodyne detection [11]–though
a “hybrid” scheme has been proposed [12] and imple-
mented [23], relying on both phase-encoded coherent
states and single-photon detection. Despite the theoret-
ical difficulties in dealing with large Hilbert spaces in a
cryptographic setting the CV platform is much easier to
implement, operates at room temperature and can use
standard telecom hardware, making it thus closer to cur-
rently implemented large-scale infrastructure [24, 25].
In the present paper we introduce a new CV QDS pro-
tocol based on a discrete-modulated alphabet of coher-
ent states, and the heterodyne detection of phase. Such
cheap and readily available resources make our scheme
highly compatible with telecom infrastructure. Crucially,
and in contrast to our previous paper [11], we now take
into account the fact that the quantum distribution chan-
nels may in general be insecure and under the control of
a malevolent party. Thus, we guard not only against dis-
honest participants inside the protocol but also against
an external eavesdropper.
Our scheme is the first fully CV QDS scheme to run
over insecure quantum channels. Remarkably, despite
relaxing an assumption on the quantum channels we are
2able to reduce the number of quantum states required to
securely sign a message. We provide a conceptually new
security proof and demonstrate that the success proba-
bility of an eavesdropper can be made arbitrarily small.
Our security proof provides collective security against
both beamsplitter attacks and entangling-cloner attacks,
with the main feature of the proof being that a dishon-
est player may fail to correctly identify an element of the
signature and yet still remain undetected to the honest
parties.
The paper is structured as follows. In section II we
describe our protocol and briefly discuss the origin of its
security. Our security proof follows in section III, and
in section IV we analyse the protocol’s performance. Fi-
nally, in section V we compare our protocol to its nearest
competitors and discuss potential extensions to our secu-
rity analysis. Technical details and a generalisation of
the protocol may be found in the appendices.
II. PROTOCOL DESCRIPTION
In the simplest instance we consider a signature scheme
involving three parties: a sender, Alice (A), and recipi-
ents, Bob (B) and Charlie (C). Alice wishes to send a
classical 1 bit messagem to Bob, which he will forward to
Charlie. This scheme may be readily extended to include
more players [26] or longer messages [27, 28].
In a successful QDS scheme, Bob and Charlie should be
able to determine that Alice is the genuine author of m.
In particular, the scheme should guard against a dishon-
est player–or an external Eve–from successfully forging
a message which is then accepted as genuine. It should
also prevent Alice from repudiating, which occurs if Al-
ice convinces Bob that a message is genuine and Charlie
that it is fake. The scheme should succeed if all parties
are honest, except with negligible probability. We allow
at most one of the players to be dishonest, noting that a
three-party protocol fails trivially if more dishonest play-
ers are permitted.
We focus on the quadrature phase-shift keying (QPSK)
alphabet of 4 phase-encoded coherent states, denoted A4
[24, 25, 29] distributed equally around the axis in phase
space (Fig. 1, inset). In Appendix B we demonstrate how
larger alphabets AN may be incorporated into our proof
and analysis.
The QDS scheme is split into two stages, Distribution
and Messaging, which can occur with significant time de-
lay. The coherent states are sent by Alice and measured
by Bob and Charlie during Distribution, while during
Messaging Alice will send the message m to Bob, ac-
companied by a classical signature. This signature is her
classical declaration of which quantum states she sent.
By comparing her declaration to their measurement out-
comes, Bob and Charlie can determine whether m is gen-
uine. Our protocol is outlined in Fig. 1 and described in
full, below.
A B
C
FIG. 1. Schematic of 3 party QDS. The parties share quan-
tum distribution channels (solid lines), public classical chan-
nels (dot-dashed lines), and Bob and Charlie share an en-
crypted classical channel (dashed lines). Initially, sender A
distributes her classical signatures {ΦBm,Φ
C
m} via the quan-
tum states |αφB,Cj 〉 by encoding into the QPSK alphabet.
Then she sends a message m to recipients Bob (B) and Char-
lie (C), with the corresponding signatures, through the public
classical channel. B and C use the signatures to authenticate
m. The encrypted classical channel is used during the Sym-
metrization step of the protocol. Inset: the QPSK alphabet
of coherent states with amplitudes α ∈ C.
A. Distribution stage: 1− 4
1. Alice wishes to send a signed 1 bit message m to
Bob and Charlie. For each possible m, Alice creates
two different classical strings, one for Bob and one for
Charlie, Φ
(B,C)
m = {φ(B,C)j }Lj=1 where the φj are phases
chosen uniformly at random from our alphabet A4 =
{1, i,−1,−i}. The signature length L is an integer suit-
ably chosen to ensure security.
2. For each element φ
(B,C)
j Alice forms the correspond-
ing coherent state |αφ(B,C)j 〉 and sends it to B,C, Fig. 1.
The amplitude α is chosen to optimise security. By anal-
ogy with classical digital signatures, we may think of the
Φ
(B,C)
m as Alice’s private keys, and the corresponding se-
quences of quantum states as her public keys. In contrast
to our previous QDS protocol we take ΦBm 6= ΦCm [11, 13].
Since coherent states are non-orthogonal an eavesdrop-
per on the quantum channel cannot gain full information
about Alice’s signatures.
3. Bob and Charlie measure the phases of the received
states by heterodyne detection [24], and keep a record
of the alphabet states which are most incompatible with
their measurements, Fig. 2. For example, if Bob mea-
sures b ∈ C with Re (b) > 0 and Im (b) > 0 then he
will “eliminate” states | − α〉 and | − iα〉 since these are
the least likely of Alice’s sent states to generate this out-
come. Recipients Bob and Charlie each now possess an
“eliminated signature” [7, 8, 11] of length L containing
3a record of which states were eliminated at each position
in the sequence. Since measurements are performed im-
mediately on receipt of the states, no quantum memory
is required [7].
FIG. 2. After measuring the phase of a distributed coher-
ent state, Bob and Charlie eliminate the two alphabet states
which were least likely to have given that outcome. (a) An in-
dividual measurement outcome x with Re (x) ≥ 0, Im (x) ≥ 0.
(b) The corresponding eliminated signature element. The
states | − α〉, | − iα〉 are the least likely from our alphabet
to give x, so they are eliminated.
4. Symmetrization: Bob and Charlie swap a random
L/2 elements of their eliminated signatures over their en-
crypted classical channel, keeping the positions and val-
ues of the swapped elements secret from Alice. Signature
elements which are forwarded by a recipient will no longer
be used by them in the protocol. This swapping will pro-
vide security against repudiation. Bob and Charlie each
now possess an eliminated signature in two halves, those
elements received directly from Alice and those received
during this Symmetrization step.
B. Messaging stage: 5− 7
5. Messaging can occur at any time after Distribution.
To sign m, Alice sends to Bob the classical triplet Σ =(
m,ΦBm,Φ
C
m
)
, consisting of the message m and classical
information ΦB,Cm about the correponding sent quantum
states.
6. Bob compares elements of Φ
(B,C)
m with the correspond-
ing elements of his eliminated signatures, and counts the
number of mismatches. A mismatch occurs if Bob has
eliminated a state which Alice claims to have sent. Note
that even when all parties are honest there will still be
some probability of mismatch as the alphabet states are
not orthogonal, so if Alice sent |α〉, Bob or Charlie can
still measure Re (x) < 0. If there are fewer than sBL/2
mismatches, for threshold sB, between each half of his
eliminated signature and Alice’s declaration, then Bob
accepts m as genuine. Otherwise he rejects it and the
protocol aborts.
7. Bob forwards Σ to Charlie, who similarly checks for
mismatches. Charlie accepts the message if there are
fewer than sCL/2 mismatches between elements of Σ and
each half of his eliminated signature. If Charlie also ac-
cepts m then the protocol has succeeded, otherwise it
aborts. The crucial parameters in steps 6 and 7 are the
s(B,C), which can be chosen to optimize security.
III. SECURITY PROOF AND ATTACK
ANALYSIS
In order to be secure, a QDS protocol must abort when
a forging or repudiation attack is attempted. From steps
6 and 7 in the protocol, the protocol aborts if the num-
ber of mismatches observed by Bob or Charlie is above
sBL/2 or sCL/2, respectively. We now demonstrate that
a forgery or repudiaton attack will induce such a large
number of mismatches, so the attacks are therefore de-
tectable. We also show that in the absence of an attack
the protocol succeeds, that is, it is robust. The protocol
fails if it allows a forging or repudiation attack, or if it
aborts even when all parties are honest. The proofs of
robustness and security against repudiation from [11] can
be directly applied to our new protocol. For complete-
ness we reproduce the key results in Eqs. (2), (3) below,
and full proofs may be found in [11]. Importantly, the
security against forgery requires a completely new anal-
ysis and this will be one of the main results presented in
the paper.
A. Robustness
A QDS protocol is called robust if it succeeds when all
parties are honest, except with a negligible probability
εrob. Since the alphabet A4 of distributed states is highly
non-orthogonal, even when all parties are honest there
is still a probability perr that a recipient eliminates the
state which Alice sent. However, perr is predictable and
can be estimated during the protocol. For a pure loss
channel with transmission T , the rate perr corresponds
to the probability of a heterodyne measurement outcome
Re (x) < 0 when Alice sent the coherent state |α〉 with
α ∈ R ≥ 0
perr =
1
2
erfc
(√
T
2
α
)
. (1)
With mismatch rate perr, we may use Hoeffding’s in-
equalities, Appendix A, to bound the probability that
Bob or Charlie detect more than s(B,C)L/2 mismatches
as
εrob ≤ 2 exp
(
− (s(B,C) − perr)2 L) (2)
provided that s(B,C) > perr. Eq. (2) is derived in [11] us-
ing Eq. (A3). The probability εrob of the protocol abort-
ing even when all parties are honest can thus be made
arbitrarily small by choice of L.
4B. Security against repudiation
Alice succeeds in a repudiation attack if she convinces
Bob that a message is genuine and Charlie that it is fake.
During Messaging, Alice will declare Φ˜Bm and Φ˜
C
m chosen
with the aim that there should be fewer than sBL/2 mis-
matches with each half of Bob’s signature, but more than
sCL/2 mismatches with at least one of Charlie’s halves.
Intuitively, security against repudiation arises from
Symmetrization (step 4 of the protocol). Since the swap-
ping occured in secret from Alice, she does not know who
holds a particular eliminated signature element. Alice is
therefore unlikely to succeed in creating a declaration
which will pass Bob’s test but fail Charlie’s.
The probability of successful repudiation is
εrep ≤ 2 exp
(
− (sC − sB)2 L
4
)
(3)
provided that sC > sB. Eq. (3) is derived fully in [11]
using Eqs. A2, A3. The probability εrep of successful
repudiation can thus be made arbitrarily small by choice
of L.
C. Security against forgery
It is the forging attack in which our analysis signifi-
cantly differs from [11]. In a successful forging attack,
a dishonest player will declare some fake m′ with the
aim that it is accepted as genuinely having originated
with Alice. The message m′ must have an appended
signature Φ′Cm , and so a forger’s goal is to determine a
fake signature which will be accepted. Since Bob already
knows half of Charlie’s eliminated signature elements–
those which Bob himself forwarded–and since it is easier
to convince Charlie than Bob to accept a fake signature
(sC > sB), the most dangerous forger is a dishonest Bob.
A bound for the probability that Bob succeeds in a forg-
ing attack provides an automatic upper bound against
any other forging player.
Since the empahsis of earlier papers [6–11] was on in-
ternal dishonesty between participants, eavesdropping on
the quantum channels was not permitted. A dishonest
Bob had only his states received from Alice with which
to gain information about Charlie’s outcomes. However,
Alice distributed identical signatures ΦBm = Φ
C
m to Bob
and to Charlie, so in-effect Bob had a perfect copy of
Charlie’s signature. Now, to mitigate against an eaves-
dropping Bob, we choose ΦBm 6= ΦCm, so that even though
dishonest Bob can gain some additional information on
Charlie’s quantum states, Bob now has a less perfect copy
of Charlie’s states than he did previously [13].
Dishonest Bob will eavesdrop on the quantum states
as Alice is distributing them to Charlie, and will try to
determine what he can declare in Φ′Cm to not cause a
mismatch. Defining pe as the probability that Bob will
induce a mismatch on a given signature element, and sC
as Charlie’s mismatch threshold, the probability εforg of
a successful forging attack is
εforg ≤ 2 exp
(
− (pe − sC)2 L
)
(4)
which is derived via Eq. (A2) by analogy with [11]. Since
sC ≤ pe can be freely chosen, we must now calculate a
lower bound on the probability pe.
D. Calculating pe
Our main contribution is a conceptually new bound for
pe, which fully takes into account the ambiguity in Bob’s
declaration. This ambiguity stems from the following.
Because Charlie eliminates two states, Fig. 2, there are
two possible states from A4 which Bob can declare with-
out introducing a mismatch. Therefore, the probability
that Bob misidentifies an element of the eliminated signa-
ture is not equivalent to the probability of mismatch. We
allow for this discrepancy by working directly in terms of
mismatch probability pe via an error variable E, and in
the proof we highlight quantities which are affected by
the degeneracy in Bob’s possible declaration. In what
follows we explicitly consider the QPSK alphabet A4.
Our security proof readily generalises to larger alphabets
AN with N = 6, 8, 10, . . . , and the required modifications
to the proof are discussed in Appendix B.
Let Xj, 1 ≤ j ≤ L/2 be an element of the half of C’s
eliminated signature which he received directly from Al-
ice, and on which Bob will attempt to gain some informa-
tion. We write Xj = {xj1, xj2} where xj1 and xj2 describe
the states from A4 which Charlie eliminated. The xj1 and
xj2 must be adjacent in A4, e.g. if xj1 = 1 then xj2 = ±i.
Let the string Y = {yj}j be Bob’s declaration, subject to
an unspecified but optimal POVM and classical strategy.
A mismatch occurs when yj = x
j
1 or yj = x
j
2. To anal-
yse the probability that this occurs we define a variable
Ej , which takes value 1 if a mismatch occurs at position
j and 0 otherwise. Then Bob’s average mismatch rate
pe = P (Ej = 1). Because Ej can take one of two val-
ues, the Shannon entropy H (Ej) is equal to the binary
entropy h (pe) = −pe log pe − (1− pe) log (1− pe).
Consider the conditional entropy H
(
Ej , x
j
1, x
j
2|yj
)
,
which is related to the uncertainty about whether a mis-
match has occured under Bob’s declaration yj. Using the
chain rule for conditional entropies [5] we write
H
(
Ej , x
j
1, x
j
2|yj
)
= H
(
Ej |xj1, xj2, yj
)
+H
(
xj1, x
j
2|yj
)
.
(5)
Since a choice of yj, x
j
1 and x
j
2 uniquely determines Ej ,
the first term on the right hand side of Eq. (5) must equal
0, so we have
H
(
Ej , x
j
1, x
j
2|yj
)
= H
(
xj1, x
j
2|yj
)
. (6)
5Using the chain rule for conditional entropies once more
on the left hand side of Eq. (5),
H
(
Ej , x
j
1, x
j
2|yj
)
= H
(
xj1, x
j
2|Ej , yj
)
+H (Ej |yj)
≤ H
(
xj1, x
j
2|Ej , yj
)
+H (Ej) (7)
where we can write the upper bound because condition-
ing cannot increase entropy.
Combining Eqs. (6), (7),
H
(
xj1, x
j
2|yj
)
≤ H
(
xj1, x
j
2|Ej , yj
)
+H (Ej)
= (1− pe)H
(
xj1, x
j
2|E = 0, yj
)
+ peH
(
xj1, x
j
2|Ej = 1, yj
)
+H (Ej) . (8)
Now because of the ambiguity in Bob’s declaration,
i.e. because there are two eliminated signature ele-
ments consistent with a given Ej = 0 and yj , and
since we can permute and relabel xj1 ↔ xj2, we have
H
(
xj1, x
j
2|Ej = 0, yj
)
≤ log2 4 = 2. We also use
the fact that Charlie eliminates exactly half of the
alphabet in order to write H
(
xj1, x
j
2|Ej = 0, yj
)
=
H
(
xj1, x
j
2|Ej = 1, yj
)
. Therefore
H
(
xj1, x
j
2|yj
)
≤ 2 +H (Ej) = 2 + h (pe) . (9)
From the definition of mutual information [5], we have
H
(
xj1, x
j
2|yj
)
= H
(
xj1, x
j
2
)
− I
(
xj1, x
j
2 : yj
)
≥ 3− χ
(
xj1, x
j
2 : yj
)
(10)
where we have used that the Holevo information χ max-
imizes the mutual information I over all POVMs, and
that H
(
xj1, x
j
2
)
= log2 8 = 3 because of the four possible
eliminated signature elements, and an additional factor
of 2 due to relabeling.
Combining Eqs. (9), (10) we arrive at
h (pe) ≥ 1− χ
(
xj1, x
j
2 : yj
)
(11)
which is one of the main results of the paper. This in-
equality can be implicitly solved for Bob’s mismatch rate
pe, and provides security against collective attacks pro-
vided that Bob’s Holevo information χ can be estimated.
E. Attack analysis
Eqs. (4), (11) determine the required signature length
to provide security of our scheme in any situation where
χ can be bounded. In order to gain some insight into the
behaviour of our protocol, in what follows we restrict Bob
to two classes of attack, the beamsplitter attack and the
entangling-cloner attack, which correspond to a pure-loss
(ξ = 0%) and thermal-loss (ξ 6= 0%) channel, respec-
tively. In an implementation it is the measured excess
noise ξ at the receiver which will determine the attack
class that Bob is assumed to have performed [25]. In sec-
tion V we remark about the optimality of these attacks.
By definition Bob’s Holevo information is [5]
χ
(
xj1, x
j
2 : yj
)
= S
(
ρjB
)
−
∑
xj
1
,xj
2
p
(
xj1, x
j
2
)
S
(
ρ
xj
1
,xj
2
B
)
(12)
with S (.) the Von Neumann entropy, ρjB Bob’s total a
priori mixed state at position j, and ρ
xj
1
,xj
2
B Bob’s state
conditioned on Charlie’s jth eliminated signature element
Xj being {xj1, xj2}.
1. Beamsplitter attack
We first consider the so-called beamsplitter attack,
Fig. 3, in which a purely lossy channel is modelled using
a beamsplitter with transmission T and vacuum input at
the fourth port, and in which Bob collects his state ρjB
from the reflected output port.
A C
B
FIG. 3. Schematic of the beamsplitter attack. Alice dis-
tributes her state ρA through a lossy channel with transmis-
sion T , modelled as a {T, 1 − T} beamsplitter with vacuum
input at the fourth port. Bob and Charlie collect their states
from the reflected and transmitted ports, respectively.
Letting |αk〉〈αk| with k = 1, 2, 3, 4 be an element of
A4, Alice’s average input state may be written as
ρjA =
1
4
4∑
k=1
|αk〉〈αk| (13)
which is transformed by the beamsplitter with vacuum
6input to become
ρjBC =
1
4
4∑
k=1
|
√
Tαk〉C〈
√
Tαk| ⊗ |
√
1− Tαk〉B〈
√
1− Tαk|.
(14)
Then Bob’s a priori state ρjB is given by
ρjB =
1
4
4∑
k=1
|
√
1− Tαk〉B〈
√
1− Tαk| (15)
from which the first term in Eq. (12) can be calculated.
Charlie performs heterodyne measurement on his half
of ρjBC and receives outcome cj ∈ C. The state ρjBC is
transformed as
ρjB|c
=
1
4
4∑
k=1
〈c|
√
Tαk〉〈
√
Tαk|c〉|
√
1− Tαk〉B〈
√
1− Tαk|
=
1
4
4∑
k=1
p (c|αk) |
√
1− Tαk〉B〈
√
1− Tαk| (16)
where p (c|αk) = 1/pi exp
(
−|c−
√
Tαk|2
)
is the proba-
blity of Charlie measuring c when the state |
√
Tαk〉 is
received, and |c〉 is a coherent state centered on c ∈ C.
On average, each eliminated signature element Xj =
{xj1, xj2} is equally likely, so for Eq. (12) it will suffice
to calculate S
(
ρ
xj
1
,xj
2
B
)
for just one. An element Xj is
uniquely determined by the quadrant in which the out-
come c lies, Fig. 4. Using Eq. (16) we may write
ρ
xj
1
,xj
2
B =
∫
ρjB|c d
2c (17)
where the integration is perfomed over an entire quad-
rant in phase space. The states ρjB and ρ
xj
1
,xj
2
B from
Eqs. (15), (17) can be inserted into Eq. (12) and the
mismatch rate pe can now be calculated.
2. Entangling cloner attack
The thermal loss channel exhibits both loss and ex-
cess noise and can be modelled by a beamsplitter with a
thermal state ρth (n¯) input into the fourth port, where n¯
is the average number of photons in the thermal state.
However, the presence of this thermal noise will allow an
eavesdropping Bob to hide a more general attack, known
as an entangling cloner attack [24, 30]. In this attack,
Bob starts with an entangled two-mode squeezed vac-
uum (TMSV) state, and one of the two entangled modes
is injected into the fourth port of the beamsplitter, Fig. 5.
FIG. 4. A single eliminated signature element corresponds to
an entire phase quadrant as an allowed region for the phase
measurement outcome. (a) An eliminated signature element.
(b) The element can be generated by any heterodyne mea-
surement outcome in the shaded region.
Once again he collects the reflected output, and performs
an optimal collective measurement on his two modes.
Since the TMSV state purifies the thermal state [24],
this attack manifests itself just as thermal noise in the
channel.
A
TMSV B
C
FIG. 5. Schematic of the entangling cloner attack. Bob re-
places the vacuum input into the beamsplitter by one of his
TMSV modes, and collects the output. Correlations between
the output and his retained TMSV mode provide him with
an additional advantage, while the attack manifests itself just
as thermal noise in the channel. Charlie measures an excess
noise ξ above shot noise.
After the beamsplitter, Bob holds a two-mode state
which is entangled with Charlie’s. The full state is
|Ψ〉jB′
1
B2C
=DˆB′
1
(√
1− Tα
)
DˆC
(√
Tα
)
∞∑
m=0
Gm√
m!
(√
T aˆ†B′
1
−
√
1− T aˆ†C
)m
|0〉B′
1
|m〉B2 |0〉C (18)
where Gm = (tanh r)
m
/ cosh r; n¯ = sinh2 r is the aver-
age number of thermal photons in one mode of the input
TMSV state; and Dˆ (α) = exp
(
αaˆ† − α∗aˆ) is the dis-
placement operator. After performing heterodyne mea-
surement on mode C and receiving outcome c ∈ C, the
state ρjB|c (n¯) = 〈c|Ψ〉〈Ψ|c〉
7Holevo information as before via Eqs. (12), (17). The
states |Ψ〉B′
1
B2C and ρ
j
B|c (n¯) are derived in Appendix C.
Finally, we note that Charlie’s probability of measuring
c ∈ C when Alice sends state |αk〉 through the channel
with transmission T and thermal noise input ρth (n¯) is
[25]
p (c|αk) (n¯) =
exp
(
− |c−
√
Tαk|2
1+(1−T )n¯
)
pi (1 + (1− T ) n¯) (19)
and so the excess noise measured at Charlie is ξ =
(1− T ) n¯/2. From Eq. (19) we can calculate perr (ξ) as
the probability P (Re (c) < 0|α) (n¯) that Charlie’s hetero-
dyne output eliminates the sent state, analogously with
Eq. (1).
F. Signature length L
Now that we have calculated pe and perr for both
beamsplitter and entangling-cloner attacks, the proba-
bility εfail that the protocol fails can be found by cal-
culating via Eqs. (2), (3), (4) the probability that the
protocol is not robust εrob; the probability of successful
repudiation εrep; and the probability of successful forgery
εforg. For a figure of merit, we assume that the protocol
can fail in any of these ways with equal probability and
set
εfail = εrob = εrep = εforg. (20)
By choosing sB = perr + (pe + perr) /4 and sC = perr +
3 (pe − perr) /4 we satisfy the second two equalities, and
so the overall probability of failure becomes
εfail ≤ 2 exp
(
− (pe − perr)2 L
16
)
(21)
provided that pe ≥ sC ≥ sB ≥ perr. The security pa-
rameter g = pe − perr quantifies the advantage that an
honest party holds over a dishonest party, and if g > 0
then our QDS protocol can be made arbitrarily secure
by an appropriate choice of L. The signature length L
required to sign m to a security level εfail may thus be
calculated using Eq. (21).
IV. PERFORMANCE OF THE PROTOCOL
The main figure of merit for a QDS protocol is the
signature length, L, required to sign a 1 bit message to
a given security level εfail. We choose the probability
of failure to be εfail = 0.01% and solve Eq. (21) for L,
under both beamsplitter and entangling-cloner attacks,
corresponding to ξ = 0% and ξ > 0%, respectively, and
for several different coherent state amplitudes used in the
alphabet.
The signature lengths for the A4 alphabet are dis-
played in Fig. 6. As expected, we see that L → ∞ as
T → 0 and the protocol can no longer be made secure
in this limit. However, for all T > 0, the security pa-
rameter g is positive and so the protocol is secure, albeit
with infeasibly large L for the smallest values of T . The
presence of realistic amounts of excess noise increases L
at all T , with increasingly drastic effects at small T –even
though Charlie will allow fewer thermal photons in the
channel as T decreases.
FIG. 6. Signature lengths L required to securely sign a 1 bit
message, for channel transmission T and coherent state ampli-
tude α. The length L→∞ as T → 0, but remains modest at
the realistic distances denoted by vertical gridlines. Left grid-
line: T = 0.20 (approx. 20 km fiber); right gridline: T = 0.48
(approx. 1 km fiber). Solid: ξ = 0% (beamsplitter attack).
Dashed: ξ = 2% (entangling-cloner attack). The required
signature length L is strongly influenced by the choice of α.
For values of T corresponding to realistic metropoli-
tan distances we observe that our QDS scheme can be
made secure with surprisingly short signature lengths L.
Assuming optical fiber with 0.2 dB loss per km, we cal-
culate T corresponding to 1 km and 20 km channels.
At these distances, displayed in the vertical gridlines of
Fig. 6, we can securely sign a 1 bit message with only
L ∼ O (105) coherent states. Combined with fast send-
ing rates typical to the CV platform, this opens up the
possiblity of signing a message in times competitive with
the O
(
10−1
)
seconds found in DV schemes ([17], and
see Fig. 7 of [21]). For example, with a feasible sending
rate of 100 MHz our protocol could securely sign a 1 bit
message in O
(
10−3
)
seconds over 20 km.
The signature lengths required under our new security
proof are shorter than under our previous protocol, de-
spite now making fewer assumptions about the power of
an eavesdropping party. For example, at T = 0.5, our
current protocol gives L = 34139 whereas the protocol
from [11] would give L = 44010. This improvement is
beacuse in our new protocol we have chosen ΦBm 6= ΦCm, so
a dishonest party is forced to eavesdrop and thus receives
an imperfect copy of Charlie’s states, whereas previously
they were given a perfect copy [11, 13].
To understand the optimal behaviour of our protocol,
we consider security parameter g instead of signature
8length, via Eq. (21). We observe in Fig. 7 that the max-
imum g–therefore smallest L–varies strongly with T and
α and only slightly with ξ. Therefore, for a given channel
it is important to pick the optimal α in order to minimise
the quantum resources required for security. This is in
sharp contrast to [11], shown in Fig 7 by red, dot-dashed
lines, where the optimal α ≈ 0.5 for all channels.
For each channel we minimize L by optimizing over α,
and the results are plotted in Fig. 8, with the required
αopt displayed in the inset. For large T a large α is opti-
mal. In this case an eavesdropper gains little information
so honest parties should try to minimise their mismatch
rate. As T decreases a smaller α will increase the eaves-
dropper’s mismatch rate but at the cost of also increasing
honest mismatches. Taking ξ 6= 0% was found to slightly
decrease αopt.
We have also considered the alphabet sizes A6, A8 and
A2, Appendix B, with their optimal L’s also plotted in
Fig. 8. Surprisingly, although for larger alphabets the op-
timal α is decreased, the minimal L is slightly increased.
As has been found elsewhere [29], the biggest leap in be-
haviour should occur between A2 → A4, and indeed this
is what we see, noting that for A2 we no longer need
to think about an eliminated signature or ambiguity and
we simply consider optimal guessing probabilities. As
the alphabet tends towards a Gaussian mixture of coher-
ent states, we expect the two attack strategies considered
in this paper to become increasingly optimal, which ex-
plains the slight increase in L for larger alphabets.
FIG. 7. (Color online). Security pa-
rameter g as it varies with α for T =
{0.61 (upper curve), 0.47, 0.19, 0.11, 0.01 (lower curve)}.
Solid: ξ = 0%. Dashed: ξ = 1%. The optimal α which
players should pick varies with T but only slightly varies
with ξ. Horizontal gridlines denote O (L) starting from
L ∼ 105 at g = 0.038 (top) and increasing by a factor of 10
at subsequent lower gridlines, Eq. (21). Red, dot-dashed:
The g varying with α for 1 km (upper curve) and 20 km fiber
(lower curve) under the previous protocol [11], for ξ = 0%.
Note that under [11] the optimal α’s do not vary with either
T or ξ.
FIG. 8. Optimal signature length L for ξ = 0%. At each
transmission T the coherent state amplitude αopt is chosen to
minimize L. We have considered alphabets A4, A6, A8, and
A2. Solid: A4. Dashed: A6. Gray, solid: A8. Dot-dashed:
A2. Inset: the corresponding αopt. Choosing an alphabet
size larger than A4 decreases the optimal αopt while slightly
increasing the required signature length L. As the alphabet
size increases it becomes closer to a Gaussian distribution,
and so the beamsplitter and entangling-cloner attack become
increasingly optimal. The largest jump in protocol efficiency
occurs from A2 to A4. Vertical gridlines denote T correspond-
ing to the 20 km (left) and 1 km (right) fiber.
V. DISCUSSION
Quantum digital signatures, which allow for secure au-
thentication of a classical message, have only recently
been proven secure against a quantum eavesdropper on
the channels [13, 15, 16]. In the present paper, we have
advanced QDS protocols operating on the continuous-
variable platform by providing security against beam-
splitter and entangling-cloner attacks on the quantum
channels. Surprisingly, short signature lengths (even
shorter than in [11] under the assumption of secure quan-
tum channels) are sufficient to ensure secure QDS over
metropolitan distances. The conceptually new security
proof has enabled us to include the fact that for each
eliminated signature element there are multiple “cor-
rect” declarations which a dishonest player can make,
and which must be taken into account.
Our security proof relied on several assumptions which
reflect the state-of-the-art of CV quantum cryptography
with our chosen alphabet, but which future work should
endeavour to relax [24, 25, 31, 32]. Firstly, the eaves-
dropping attacks permitted by a malevolent Bob in this
work do not give him the full power afforded by quan-
tum mechanics. The non-Gaussianity of our alphabet is
restrictive here, and the entangling-cloner attack is only
expected to be optimal as the limiting case that the al-
phabet becomes Gaussian, i.e. for α → 0 [33, 34]. For
our alphabet with discrete modulation, a wider class of
non-Gaussian attacks may provide an eavesdropper with
9an advantage, and more work is needed to explore opti-
mal classes of non-Gaussian attack. In a general protocol
these effects could be taken into account for example by
tomographically reconstructing the state ρB which max-
imizes the Holevo information χ, while remaining con-
sistent with Charlie’s measurement outcomes–though we
note that the resources required for this will be expen-
sive and may undermine the ease-of-use which our scheme
currently boasts. Another possible route towards improv-
ing security would be an extension of results known for
QKD with 2 state [31] and 3 state [32] alphabets to our
A4, noting recent progress in [25].
Techniques used in our security proof will in future al-
low us for possibility to explore different security tasks,
such as secret sharing [35] or oblivious transfer [36], and
to design protocols relying on the same modest physical
requirements which we used here. One may also begin
to consider consider finite-size effects [37], which are in-
trinsic to any QDS scheme, noting the operational links
between the guessing probabilities considered in this pa-
per and the smooth min-entropy [38]. Advances in calcu-
lating optimal lower bounds for the smooth min-entropy
will have immediate and direct application to CV QDS,
and may be readily incorporated into our security proof.
The security of our QDS protocol and the short time
required to sign a message, stemming both from the con-
ceptually new security proof and the practical advantages
of the CV platform, make CV QDS an attractive scheme
for secure communications in a quantum future. It may
soon be possible to move to real-world implementation
of our scheme, with opportunity to run alongside related
QKD schemes [39].
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Appendix A: Hoeffding’s inequalities
Hoeffding’s inequalities [40, 41] provide a bound for
the probability that the empirical mean of n independent
outcomes differs from the expectation. The most useful
form for our purposes is shown below, and we briefly
demonstrate how they may be utilised in our security
proof. A full treatment can be found in [10, 11].
1. Hoeffding’s inequalities.
Let X1, . . . , Xn be independent binary random vari-
ables. Let X¯ be their empirical mean, and E
(
X¯
)
their
expected value. Then for every ε ≥ 0 the following are
true
P
(
X¯ − E (X¯) ≥ ε) ≤ exp (−2ε2n)
P
(
E
(
X¯
)− X¯ ≥ ε) ≤ exp (−2ε2n) (A1)
2. Application to QDS.
Let F be a string of declared phases, and G be an
eliminated signature. Define a string E
Ej =
{
1 if Fj is eliminated in Gj
0 otherwise
which measures the number of mismatches between F
and G. All strings are of length n. We wish to bound the
probability that the number of mismatches is below some
threshold sn, or equivalently the probability P
(
E¯ ≤ s)
that the observed mismatch rate E¯ = 1/n
∑n
j=1 Ej is
below s. Then we have
P
(
E¯ ≤ s) = P (E (E¯)− E¯ ≥ E (E¯)− s)
≤ exp
(
−2 (E (E¯)− s)2 n) (A2)
where the equality follows trivially provided that E (E)−
s ≥ 0, and the inequality is an application of Eq. (A1).
Bounds on P
(
s ≤ E¯) may be similarly derived:
P
(
s ≤ E¯) ≤ exp(−2 (s− E (E¯))2 n) . (A3)
Appendix B: Larger alphabets
We show that our central result, Eq. (11), holds for all
alphabets AN with N = 2k; k ∈ N; consisting of coher-
ent states equally distributed about the origin in phase
space. We also remark on any required modifications to
the calculations presented in the paper.
During the protocol, Bob and Charlie should eliminate
exactly N/2 coherent states, using the same strategy as
in Fig 2. Otherwise the running of the protocol remains
the same.
As before, Eqs. (5), (6), (7), we start with
H
(
Ej , x
j
1, . . . , x
j
N/2|yj
)
and use the chain rule for con-
ditional entropies twice, giving
H
(
xj1, . . . , x
j
N/2|yj
)
= H
(
xj1, . . . , x
j
N/2|Ej , yj
)
+H (Xj |yj)
once we have taken into account that
H
(
Ej |xj1, . . . , xjN/2, yj
)
= 0. Using H (Ej |yj) ≤ h (pe)
and the fact that Bob and Charlie eliminate exactly N/2
out of N possible alphabet states, we arrive at
H
(
xj1, . . . , x
j
N/2|yj
)
≤ H
(
xj1, . . . , x
j
N/2|Ej = 0, yj
)
+h (pe) ,
therefore
H
(
xj1, . . . , x
j
N/2
)
− χ
(
xj1, . . . , x
j
N/2 : yj
)
≤ H
(
xj1, . . . , x
j
N/2|Ej = 0, yj
)
+ h (pe) .
To complete the proof of Eq. (11) we simply observe
H
(
xj1, . . . , x
j
N/2
)
= log2
(
N × N
2
!
)
H
(
xj1, . . . , x
j
N/2|Ej = 0, yj
)
= log2
(
N
2
× N
2
!
)
,
where we have taken into account relabeling, and Eq. (11)
follows immediately.
The quantities used to calculate the Holevo informa-
tion must also be altered in order to reflect the different
alphabet. Bob’s a priori state becomes
ρjB =
1
N
N∑
k=1
|
√
1− Tαk〉B〈
√
1− Tαk|, (B1)
the state ρjB|c is similarly transformed–both for beam-
splitter attack and entangling-cloner attack. The inte-
gration limits of Eq. (17) are also altered so that each
segment now occupies an angular width of 2pi/N . Finally,
since Bob and Charlie eliminate exactlyN/2 of the alpha-
bet, the probability perr that a heterodyne measurement
should eliminate Alice’s sent state remains unchanged.
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Appendix C: Two-mode squeezed vacuum
We will calculate the |Ψ〉jB1′B2C and ρ
j
B|c required for
the entangling cloner attack, Fig. 5. Our starting point is
the state shared between Alice and Bob before the chan-
nel. Alice generates coherent state |α〉 and Bob generates
a two-mode squeezed vacuum (TMSV) state [42]. Then
Alice and Bob share the three-mode state
|α〉A|TMSV〉B1B2 = DˆA (α) |0〉A
∞∑
m=0
Gm
(
aˆ†B1
)m
√
m!
|0〉B1 |m〉B2
(C1)
where |α〉 = Dˆ (α) |0〉 and Dˆ (α) = exp (αaˆ† − α∗aˆ) is
the displacement operator; and where we have written
|m〉B1 =
(
aˆ†B1
)m
/
√
m!|0〉B1 . The coefficient Gm =
(tanh r)m / cosh r where r parametrises the number of
thermal photons n¯ in each of the two modes via n¯ =
sinh2 r.
The beamsplitter transforms our creation operators as(
aˆC
aˆB′
1
)
=
( √
T −√1− T√
1− T √T
)(
aˆA
aˆB1
)
. (C2)
Using Eq. (C2) we transform our input state to give
|Ψ〉jB′
1
B2C
= DˆB′
1
(√
1− Tα
)
DˆC
(√
Tα
)
∞∑
m=0
Gm
(√
T aˆ†B′
1
−√1− T aˆ†C
)m
√
m!
|0〉B′
1
|m〉B2 |0〉C
(C3)
where we have used the fact that aˆB′
1
and aˆC com-
mute. The state Eq. (C3) may be computed by using
the binomial expansion on the brackets, and the state
ρjB|c (n¯) = 〈c|Ψ〉〈Ψ|c〉 can now be computed.
